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TOmASz KAmUSELLA
HybRId WAR: REAL CASUALTIES  IN UKRAINE1
A b s t r a c t
The Russo-Ukrainian war that broke out in 2014 in the wake 
of Russia’s annexation of Crimea continues to be all too rarely 
noticed in the West. Observers comment widely on the novel 
‘hybrid’ character of warfare as developed and trialed by the 
Kremlin worldwide during the recent years, but pay scant at-
tention to the Russian ‘training ground’ in eastern Ukraine. 
The article probes into the realities of the ongoing Russo-
Ukrainian war, alongside the ideological underpinnings of the 
Kremlin’s intervention and Ukraine’s response to this attack. 
It appears that the Russian government adopted ethnolinguis-
tic nationalism, typical of Central Europe, namely, that all Rus-
sian-speakers constitute the Russian nation, especially if their 
communities compactly inhabit areas directly bordering on the 
Russian Federation.
K e y  w o r d s: ethnolinguistic nationalism; hybrid war; Russo-
Ukrainian war; Russia; Ukraine
WOjNA HybRydOWA: PRAWdzIWE OFIARy 
WOjNy ROSyjSKO-UKRAIńSKIEj
S t r e s z c z e n i e
Wojna rosyjsko-ukraińska, która wybuchła w 2014 r. w następ-
stwie aneksji Krymu przez Rosję, jest nadal zbyt rzadko za-
uważana na Zachodzie. Obserwatorzy szeroko komentują „hy-
brydowy” charakter działań wojennych, wypracowywanych 
i wypróbowywanych przez Kreml po całym świecie w ciągu 
1 I thank Leonid Zashkilnyak (Ivan Franko National University of Lviv), Iaroslav Hrytsak (Ukrainian Catholic 
University, Lviv), Catherine Gibson (European University Institute, Florence), Kurt Bassuener (University of 
St Andrews), alongside Jacek Serwański and Anna Jawor at Sprawy Narodowościowe / Nationalities Affairs 
for their helpful comments and suggestions.
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ostatnich lat, lecz nie zwracają uwagi na rosyjski „poligon doświadczalny” we wschodniej Ukrainie. 
Artykuł analizuje realia toczącej się tam wojny rosyjsko-ukraińskiej, jak i ideologiczne założenia inter-
wencji militarnej Kremla oraz reakcję Ukrainy na tenże atak ze strony Rosji. Wydaje się, że rosyjski 
rząd przyjął jako uzasadnienie etnolingwistyczny nacjonalizm (typowy dla Europy Środkowej), a mia-
nowicie, że wszystkie osoby rosyjskojęzyczne to członkowie narodu rosyjskiego, zwłaszcza jeśli ich 
społeczności zamieszkują tereny bezpośrednio graniczące z obszarem Federacji Rosyjskiej.
S ł o w a  k l u c z o w e: nacjonalizm etnicznojęzykowy; Rosja; Ukraina; wojna hybrydowa; wojna 
rosyjsko-ukraińska
RUSSIA’S POST-SOvIET WARS
The undeclared Russian onslaught on Ukraine commenced in late 2013. The Euro-maidan Revolution (also, and in my view more appropriately, known as the Revo-lution of Dignity) held in Kyiv and some other Ukrainian cities in the dead of the 
2013/14 winter showed the determination of the Ukrainians to join the Euro-Atlantic 
structures (Chupryna, 2014). The government of Mr Viktor Yanukovych—discredited by 
making Ukraine tightly allied with Russia (some would say that even into ‘a Russian colo-
ny’) against the will of the majority of the Ukrainians hoping for their country’s accession 
to the European Union (Dempsey, 2014; Moser, 2013; Velychenko, 2013)—ordered the 
use of live ammunition and snipers against the peaceful protesters. Yanukovych and his 
closest associates then fled (with whatever they could grab of their amassed ill-gotten 
fortunes) to their pay and taskmaster in Moscow. The undeclared Russian onslaught on 
Ukraine swiftly followed. It is the largest and most tragic international conflict between 
post-Soviet states in Europe. The 1992 Russo-Moldovan war in eastern Moldova (or Tran-
snistria) left around 1,000 dead in its wake (Dal Santo, 2015). Sixteen years later, the 
casualties of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war in the nominally Georgian autonomous re-
publics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia amounted to over 600 (“Russo-Georgian war”, 
2017).2 In the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war 11,000 to 15,000 people have been killed 
by mid-2017 (J. Harding, 2016; Petrov, 2017b)  and 1.6 million have left the warzone as 
internal or international refugees (“Ukraine: Global focus”, 2017).3 To this number, 50,000 
refugees from Russian-occupied Crimea must be added (Berezovets, 2015). The scale of 
the human losses and tragedy in this conflict quickly approaches that of the intra-Soviet 
and subsequently post-Soviet Armenian-Azeri war (1988-1994), which killed over 20,000 
people (Zürcher, 2007, pp. 179–180), sending a wave of 1.2 million refugees and IDPs 
away from their homes (Frelick, 1994; Rettman, 2017). Fortunately, for the time being, 
the casualties caused by the Russian attack on Ukraine do not approach the genocidal-
scale bloodbath of the two Russo-Chechen wars (1994-1996, 1999-2009) with the stag-
gering death toll of 200,000-300,000 out of the total population of over 800,000.4
2 Moscow prefers the unsubstantiated number of 2,000 casualties, mostly non-Georgians purportedly killed 
by Georgian forces (Cheterian, 2009, p. 160).
3 Some would add to the aforementioned estimate 400,000 refugees who found shelter in Russia (cf Seme-
novich, 2016).
4 This is a high estimate of the casualties, including Russian soldiers. Due to political reasons, there is not a 
single reliable register of those who lost their lives during the two recent Russo-Chechen wars. Obviously, 
Moscow and the pro-Kremlin government of today’s Chechnia prefer lower estimates of casualties, hover-
ing around 120,000 (Riazantsev, 2005).
 Chechen and western sources quote numbers that are substantially higher, even twice and three times the 
Russian official estimate (“Chechen official”, 2005; “Over 200,000”, 2004; Strade, 2005).
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In contrast to the current Russo-Ukrainian war, the Armenian-Azeri conflict was large-
ly a Soviet civil war, just as the Russo-Chechen conflicts were Russian civil wars. They 
were all fought (with the lone exception of the still somewhat ‘Soviet’ Transnistrian con-
flict) within the borders of a single polity. Hence, the level of violence the Vladimir Putin 
administration is now ready to unleash on a sovereign nation-state bordering Russia in 
the case of the ongoing intervention in eastern Ukraine is unprecedented. The number of 
human losses—own and inflicted—seems to be fast becoming a non-issue. In Russia’s 
wars against Moldova and Georgia, the Kremlin seemed to take care to limit the number 
of casualties. However, the Russian administration seems to have gradually developed 
an immunity to an increasing death toll with each conflict of this kind. This acceptance 
of casualties still does not compare with that tolerated in the Soviet Union. The Kremlin 
decided to pull out of Afghanistan only after the Soviet decade-long intervention had left 
between 600,000 and 2 million dead in its wake (Katzman, 2003, p. 219; Khalidi, 1991, 
p. 101; Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005, p. 154).
Significantly, all the conflicts fought by post-Soviet Russia outside its own territory 
took place in Europe. This direction seems to indicate Moscow’s geopolitical priorities, 
among others, entailing a certain resignation from Siberia and the Far East, progressive-
ly drawn into China’s economic (and political?) orbit (“Unlikely partners”, 2017, p. 52). 
After 1991, the Kremlin exclusively attacked other post-Soviet states, viewed from the 
perspective of Boris Yeltsin’s doctrine of ‘near abroad’ (blizhnee zarubezh’e) as parts of 
Russia’s exclusive sphere of influence. Not a single post-Soviet state was attacked by 
Russia in post-Soviet Asia. These polities typically are more authoritarian than Russia it-
self, and mostly do the Kremlin’s bidding, with the qualified exceptions of Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan. Uniquely, the former polity is one of the most repressive in the world, on 
a par with North Korea or Eritrea. Between 1991 and 2006 Ashgabat expelled two-thirds 
of its Russian (Russophone) population, or over 200,000. At present about 100,000 Rus-
sians (or Orthodox Russian-speakers) remain in Turkmenistan, though officially Ashgabat 
acknowledges only 50-odd individuals as Russians who still reside in the country (“Rus-
sians ‘flee’”, 2003).5 The official policy of Turkmenization was declared to have been suc-
cessfully completed in the first decade of the 21st century. Nowadays only Turkmens live 
in Turkmenistan. With its rich oil resources, one would think that this state should be the 
foremost target of the Kremlin’s ire, especially after the drastic ethnic cleansing of eth-
nic Russians. However, fortunately for Ashgabat, the country is isolated from Russia by 
Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea. After 2009, most of Turkmen gas flows now to China 
rather than Russia. Ashgabat appears to have left the Russian sphere of influence, and 
Turkmenistan effectively became a Chinese satellite. Somehow, the Kremlin has acquies-
ced to this seismic shift in the Asian geopolitics (Babaeva, 2016; Sorbello, 2017).
The ‘oil-less’ Ukraine appears more important to the Kremlin’s strategists than Turk-
menistan. Kyiv—the ancient capital of medieval Rus’—is now the capital of Ukraine, 
though the Russian national master narrative claims specious historical and political con-
tinuity between Rus’ and Russia. The medieval polity is typically dubbed ‘early Russia’ 
(drevniaia Rossiia) in Russian school textbooks and even in scholarly works (cf Solov’ev, 
 Furthermore, at the beginning of the first Russo-Chechen war, in 1991-1992, Ingushetia was separated 
from the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as a separate autonomous republic, which 
complicates any follow-up statistics. In 1989 the population of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR was comprised of 
734,000 Chechens, 294,000 Russians (Russophones), 164,000 Ingushes and 14,000 Armenians (“Vsesoi-
uznaia perepis’”, n.d.).
5 Obviously, some Russians (Russophones) left Turkmenistan out of their own volition, hoping for a life in 
a democratic country.
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1997). In the eyes of a Russian imperialist or nationalist, Ukraine is an inalienable part 
of the East Slavic world, seen as Russia’s cultural and political zone of influence. In this 
scheme, the Ukrainians and Belarusians are perceived to be the ‘younger brethren’ of the 
Russians. It is the Russians who lead. They know better what is good for the ‘younger 
siblings,’ meaning all the modern post-Rus’ polities.
In the Kremlin’s view the European (that is, Slavic) part of Russia, together with Ukrai-
ne (except for Western Ukraine, or Galicia, which the Moscow considers as ‘lost’ for the 
Russian cause, due to the region’s overlong exposure to western ideas in the Habsburg 
Monarchy) and Belarus constitute the indivisible ethnopolitical core of Russia. This ideolo-
gy of Great Russianness, with disregard for any ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, histo-
ric, or political distinctiveness of the Belarusians and Ukrainians originated in the Russian 
Empire and continued under a variety of guises in the Soviet Union. For instance, the 
Soviet Union had three seats in the United Nations, one for the Soviet Union itself (or in 
reality, for Russia), while the other two for Belarus and Ukraine. Yet, this arrangement 
was not to acknowledge the separateness of the two latter republics vis-à-vis Russia, 
but rather to emphasize the joint sovereignty of the Great Russians and their importance 
on the international scene, in comparison to the ‘imperialist Americans’ with just a single 
seat in the United Nations (Bailey & Daws, 1995, p. 15).
A legacy of this ideology persists in today’s Ukraine, weakening somewhat the 
country’s ability to defend itself against the ongoing Russian military aggression. For in-
stance, in 2015, after two years of war, a sociological poll found out that 54 per cent of 
Ukrainians saw Russia as a country that was the closest to Ukraine from among any other 
foreign (including post-Soviet) states. Even more, because over 66 per cent of Ukrainians 
declared that they felt a strong or very strong affinity with Russian language and culture 
(Zashkil’niak, 2016). It means that as many as two-thirds of Ukrainians are inclined to get 
opinions and news from Russia’s mass media, opening themselves willingly or inadverten-
tly to the Kremlin’s anti-Ukrainian propaganda. However, contrary to what the Putin admi-
nistration may like to think, it does not mean the Ukrainians would acquiesce to a Russian 
conquest or partition of their state. As a matter of fact, the popular support for the inde-
pendence of Ukraine as a state remains robust. In the wake of the Russian annexation of 
Crimea it rapidly spiked from 75 to over 90 per cent (I. Hrytsak, personal communication, 
July 16, 2017; Soldak, 2014) (a similar phenomenon was observed in the rise of the Ukrai-
nians’ support for their country’s membership in NATO; McLaughlin, 2017).
The hard facts of the war that Russia currently wages against Ukraine slowly attenuate 
the aforementioned Russophilia, which is still widespread among the Ukrainians. Rather, 
it should actually be interpreted as nostalgia for the Soviet Union or a postcolonial longing 
for the once largest land empire in the world—an empire in which Ukrainians also had 
a stake, as civil servants, soldiers, entrepreneurs, railwaymen, or settlers (Loza, 2015, 
pp. 198–199).6 The situation is similar to a generalized and rather vague pro-British sen-
timent among the Irish or Scots whose ancestors (at least some of them) used to profit 
quite substantially from participating in the expansion and maintenance of the worldwide 
British Empire. Despite speaking and writing in English, participating in global Anglopho-
ne culture and literature—which is this empire’s lasting legacy—no Irish would agree to 
6 The participation of ethnic Ukrainians (‘Cossacks’) in this settlement of the Russian Empire’s new territories 
along the north Black Sea littoral and in the Caucasus is lauded as an extension of the ‘Ukrainian ethnographic 
territory’ (cf Loza, 2015, pp. 196–197, 234–235), but it is rarely remarked that this process entailed the simul-
taneous expulsion and even extermination of the Turkicphone and Circassian-speaking Muslim populations 
(Donaldson, 1877; McCarthy, 1995; Richmond, 2013; TSutsiev, 2007, pp. 20–23, 31–35, 38, 69–70).
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Ireland’s loss of independence to Britain, and likewise hardly any Scot would consent 
to a Scotland with no devolved status (that is, the country’s wide-ranging autonomy in 
present-day Britain).
Ukrainian liberal historiography has long proposed that the main difference between 
the Ukrainians and Russians is not delineated by culture and language, as typical of cen-
tral Europe. As a matter of fact, both nations linguistically and culturally are closely re-
lated, and have mostly refrained from politicizing this type of difference as the basis of 
separateness. These two nations differ most substantially in the realm of civic values, 
and political attitudes and traditions; the Russian tradition stemming from Muscovian 
autocracy, while its Ukrainian counterpart from Poland-Lithuania’s noble democracy and 
Austria-Hungary’s parliamentarianism. The fundamental difference between the Ukraine 
and Russia rests in how both nations approach relations between state and society, and 
how Ukrainians and Russians (or people identifying as Ukrainians and Russians, irrespec-
tive of their linguistic, ethnic or religious background) believe these relations should be 
organized. In their thinking on this matter, the former prefer democracy and the rule of 
law as practiced in the west (I. Hrytsak, personal communication, July 16, 2017; Rudnyt-
sky, 1987). On the other hand, the latter extoll the civilizational uniqueness of Russia’s 
political system, alongside some ‘historical mission’ (cf Hille & Seddon, 2016; Kalb, 2008; 
Poltoratzky, 1967) that this country is supposed to fulfill for the sake of the entire world. 
In practical terms, the Russian case sizzles down to an authoritarian empire (‘large state’) 
led by a single ruler (‘strongman’) (I. Hrytsak, personal communication, July 16, 2017).
The partial ban on Russian software, online social media platforms and traditional 
mass media (that used to give the Kremlin’s intelligence services a backdoor access to 
Ukraine’s vital state systems and the possibility to shape the country’s public opinion) in-
troduced in 2017 (Bershidsky, 2017; Luhn, 2017; “Ukraine bans its top social networks”, 
2017) should have been introduced already four years ago. Time is of the essence. Each 
additional day that the Kremlin has the opportunity to expose the Ukrainians to Russian 
propaganda may tip the precarious balance of attitudes held by the public opinion in a di-
rection that might facilitate Russian victory. To many a Ukrainian, it is still appalling that 
the choice of Russian-language titles is now rather limited in bookshops across Ukraine, 
and that such Russian publications are actually banished to the section with books in fo-
reign languages. Furthermore, Russian-language films for broadcasting in Ukraine must 
now be supplied with Ukrainian subtitles (this policy began some 15 years ago, but now 
is strenuously enforced). However, in central Europe, where in line with the strictures of 
ethnolinguistic nationalism, language is so strongly equated with nation and statehood, 
it cannot be the other way around. The post-Soviet states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithua-
nia also follow this paradigm. The need to prioritize language politics is especially true of 
Ukraine’s situation now, when Moscow chooses to emphasize the Russian language as 
the main indicator of where Russia’s ‘true borders’ should extend beyond today’s Rus-
sian Federation. At present the Kremlin shares central Europe’s normative political belief 
that a proper nation-state must enjoy its own separate language. This is the Ukrainian 
language in Ukraine. Hence, if more printed and online material would have continued 
to be available in Russian rather than in Ukrainian, Kyiv would have made itself vulnerab-
le to Moscow’s propaganda, which claims that the majority of Ukraine’s population are 
Russian-speakers, meaning ‘Russians’ from the Kremlin’s perspective.7
7 Obviously, the push for making Ukrainian the sole accepted and legal medium of business, technology 
and scholarship in today’s Ukraine comes at a cost, because Russian has traditionally dominated in these 
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This danger is keenly perceived by numerous Ukrainian politicians and commentators. 
Interestingly, after the Euromaidan Revolution, some Russian-speaking Ukrainians of a libe-
ral persuasion proposed to redefine the Russian language as employed in Ukraine’s public 
sphere (I. Hrytsak, personal communication, July 16, 2017). They argued that Russian, like 
English, became de-ethnicized due to the centuries-long employment across the sprawling 
expanses of the multicultural Russian Empire, which in its last period morphed into the 
Soviet Union. For that matter such a phenomenon of de-ethnicization is commonplace in 
the case of any post-imperial languages. For instance, an English-speaker cannot be auto-
matically identified as an Englishwoman, she may also be a Canadian, American, Jamaican, 
Pakistani or Zimbabwean. Likewise, a Portuguese-speaker may be an Angolan or Brazilian, 
not only a Portuguese. From this point of view, speaking Russian cannot be interpreted 
as the person’s declaration of Russian ethnic or civic identity. A Russian-speaker may also 
be a Ukrainian, Israeli, Kazakh, or Latvian. That is why, as in a computer’s settings one can 
choose between US, UK or New Zealand English, one should also enjoy a similar opportu-
nity to choose between Ukrainian, Muscovian (Rossiiskii), Kazkh(stani) or Latvian Russian.
To this end, a comprehensive dictionary and grammar of Ukrainian Russian8 could be 
compiled with an emphasis on specific vocabulary and phrases that reflect Ukraine’s so-
ciopolitical and cultural character. Unfortunately, as to my knowledge, no dictionary (or 
grammar) of Ukrainian Russian has been attempted yet, let alone published. An Austrian 
attending elementary school in Vienna or Graz is required to consult an Austrian dictionary 
of the German language recommended by the Ministry of Education, not a dictionary of 
this language published in Germany or Switzerland. I keep fingers crossed that in not too 
distant a future Russian-speaking Ukrainians may have the opportunity to avail themselves 
of a state-approved dictionary of Ukrainian Russian, and software companies may reply to 
this demand by including Ukrainian Russian as an option in computer language settings.9
A NEW RUSSIAN WORLd
The Kremlin is silent on the geopolitical expansion of China in post-Soviet central Asia, 
careful not to anger Beijing. The American diplomat and political scientist Zbigniew 
Brzeziński predicted that after the breakup of the Soviet Union Russia faces the existential 
spheres. It was the war effort and its geopolitical context that forced this change on Ukraine. Should this 
situation persist, perhaps, it means than in the span of a decade or so, English may take over Russian as 
Ukraine’s preferred international lingua franca.
8 By saying ‘Ukrainian Russian’ I do not mean Surzhyk, or a highly changeable mixed variety of Ukrainian and 
Russian (or at times, Polish) that sprang up when Russification enforced in Soviet Ukraine caused numer-
ous Ukrainophones to aspire to speak in Russian as a marker of their social and economic advancement. 
Often this aspiration was not propped up with more than rudimentary or elementary education in Russian. 
As a result, numerous lexical and syntactic similarities between both languages led many socially mobile 
Ukrainian-speakers (alongside ethnically Russian civil servants in Ukraine) to believe—wrongly—that there 
is no substantial gap between standard Ukrainian and standard Russian. Of course, if the stigma of a ‘low 
variety’ is removed from Surzhyk (which is at present unlikely), it could be standardized into a language in 
its own right. But such a development could play in the Kremlin’s hands, because on this linguistic basis 
Moscow could propose that the eastern half of Ukraine is inhabited by a ‘Surzhyk nation’ that is different 
from the Ukrainian nation. A pronouncement of this type could justify Russia’s efforts to separate (or even 
annex) eastern Ukraine’s industrial regions from the rest of the country (cf Hentschel, Taranenko, & Zaprud-
ski, 2014). (I thank Catherine Gibson for drawing my attention to this aspect.)
9 Obviously, another option would be to rename the Russian language in Ukraine (for instance, as ‘Rusan’ or 
‘Rosan’ from Rus’, or the ‘Kyivan language’ from the capital of Rus’), and fashion it into a language in its own 
right, separate from both Russian and Ukrainian. This route was followed in the post-Yugoslav countries, 
where the former Serbo-Croatian was replaced with Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian. But an 
option of this kind does not seem to be on the cards in Ukraine.
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choice of becoming a democratic country allied with the West, or will succumb to China’s 
overwhelming economic, political, and cultural influence (Brzezinski, 2017).10 Neither of 
these options appeals to Mr Putin. His administration’s sights, in line with the 18th-century 
Petrine tradition, are set squarely on the west. The goal is not to join the Euro-Atlantic 
structures, but rather that Russia may retain its status as global power, simultaneously 
doubling as a civilization in its own right. A civilization that would use the west’s tech-
nological and other achievements for Russia’s own political and cultural projects (for in-
stance, ‘managed democracy’) and try to make as much of Europe as possible part of 
Moscow’s sphere of influence (cf Grier, 2003). But at present with insufficient economic 
resources to hand for carrying out such a project on its own (TSygankov, 2007, p. 215), 
Moscow hopes to veer between the West and China, so that both would do its bidding. 
The currently worsening relations between the Unites States and China stand in contrast 
to the Kremlin’s happy rapport with Beijing. American President Donald Trump’s erratic 
governance is not helping to repair the US’s ties with China and seems to be pushing both 
states on a collision course (Phillips, 2017). Meanwhile, Mr Trump’s unreasonable praises 
of Mr Putin and his Russia diminishes Europe’s and China’s faith in Washington’s stability 
and predictability.11 As a result, the Kremlin has been left to do as it pleases in the Euro-
pean ‘near abroad,’ far from both China and the increasingly isolationist United States.
To the outside observer, the Kremlin’s ambition seems to aim at transforming Russia 
into a homogenous ethnolinguistic nation-state, as is usual in central Europe. Many com-
mentators point out that over 80 per cent of Russia’s population is ethnically Russian. 
Furthermore, in 2002 the Russian Duma (Parliament) passed a law that requires all lan-
guages indigenous to the Russian territory to be written exclusively in Cyrillic, which is 
popularly termed the ‘Russian alphabet.’ But to a degree, Mr Putin, for the sake of dome-
stic opinion, blurs the distinction between ‘Russian-in-ethnic terms’ (Russkii) and ‘Russian
-in-civic-terms’ (Rossiiskii). The latter term refers to the entire Russian Federation or even 
to all the post-Soviet space, understood as the historical and territorial legacy of the Rus-
sian Empire (perhaps, with a qualified exception of the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania, because they had functioned as independent nation-states in the interwar 
period). On the other hand, the concept Russkii may be interpreted narrowly as referring 
to Russians, namely, all Russian-speakers, or even exclusively to Russophone Orthodox 
Christians. The broader interpretation encompasses all the East Slavophone Orthodox 
faithful, or the Russians, together with the Belarusians and Ukrainians. In the typically 
imperial manner, Mr Putin plays with all these interpretations, deploying that whichever 
may suit the Kremlin’s needs at a given moment.
About the time when the process of Turkmenization was completed in Turkmenistan, 
Moscow adopted a new policy of the ‘Russian world’ (Russkii mir) in 2007. It entails that 
all the territories adjacent to Russia and compactly inhabited by Russian-speakers are ‘na-
turally’ part of this world; potentially ‘unredeemed parts’ of the ‘true’ Russian nation-state 
(Moore, 2002), in the late 19th-century tradition of Italian irredentism (“About Ruskiyi Mir 
Foundation”, 2017; Zakem & Saunders, 2016). This national polity comes in the overcoat 
of the renewed Russian Empire, now translated into a seemingly economic form of the 
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) (“Sergei Naryshkin”, 2012). Armenia and Kyrgyzstan 
are ‘ornamental’ additions to this Union, while its core is the ‘internal Russian world’ 
10 I thank Kurt Bassuener for drawing my attention to this scenario.
11 The 2017 tension between the US and North Korea seems also to be forcing a wedge between Beijing and 
Washington (Kirby, 2017).
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comprising Russia, Belarus and (especially northern) Kazakhstan.12 From the perspective 
of Russian history, this new policy seems to be a revival of the project of the gathering of 
the ‘Russian’ (Rus’) lands, originally commenced in the early 16th-century Muscovy. It was 
coupled with the parallel but the never officially declared process of the ‘gathering the 
lands of the Golden Horde’ (as termed by the German historian of multicultural Russia, 
Andreas Kappeler); hence, the Kremlin’s present-day insistence that the EAEU includes 
ethnically non-Russian states in the Caucasus and central Asia.
From the Kremlin’s perspective, the pivotal piece that is still missing from this Russian 
world-under-construction is Ukraine, alongside Moldova and ‘Russian Europe’ (russkaia 
Evropa) (cf Lishka, 2008; “Russkaia Evropa”, 2017; “Zhit’ v ‘Russkoı˘ Evrope’”, 2017) or 
‘our Europe’ (nasha Evropa) (cf Gil’ferding, 2010; honigkuchen, 2016; Kirsis, 2001; Laks-
hin, 2016; “Nasha Evropa”, 2016; Zima, 2018). The last concept—largely unofficial, tho-
ugh it crops up in Russian journalese and titles of Russian-language guidebooks—typically 
encompasses the post-Soviet polities of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which now are 
members of the EU and NATO. In addition, the danger is for Helsinki that Moscow may 
also count Finland in this vague and malleable concept of the Russian world, should the 
country dare to join NATO. However, in the current pattern of Russian thinking on geopo-
litics, the main element of the Russkii mir jigsaw that must be expeditiously dealt with is 
Ukraine. Only after having secured this country, would the Putin administration feel com-
fortable in its endeavors to expand hard Russian influence farther across the rest of the 
potential zone of the Russian world, including actual annexations of territory. Ideally, the 
frontiers of ‘true Russia’ should overlap with the full extent of the Russian world.
The Russian decision to attack Ukraine and seize Crimea came at a cost. The main 
foundation of the postwar political architecture of peace and stability in Europe and the 
post-Soviet area was cast aside, namely the Helsinki Accords of 1975 (“Helsinki Final 
Act, 1975”, 2017). The Kremlin violated most of the Accords’ ten principles, including the 
crucial Articles 3 and 4 that declare the post-1945 frontiers to be inviolable and guarantee 
the territorial integrity of the extant polities. In the future, this breach of the established 
political order will be seen as the end of the postcommunist transition period, and the 
harbinger of a new, as yet nameless, era. The Russian war waged against Ukraine, with 
no sufficiently vocal protests (let alone a political or military action) on the part of the Uni-
ted States or Britain, showed that the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assuran-
ces was worth less than the paper to which it was committed.
In accordance with this document, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine gave up their 
post-Soviet stockpiles of nuclear weapons to Russia. This was done in exchange for the 
assurance of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the three aforementioned states, as 
jointly guaranteed by Moscow, Washington, and London. The ongoing Russian attack on 
Ukraine is a clear warning to Belarus and Kazakhstan that these states should stay squa-
rely within the political and military sphere of Russia’s influence, or face retribution. The 
opening of this new era of renewed instability in Europe was sealed in 2015. In this year 
the resurgent Russia of imperial ambitions intervened in Syria. By now (mid-2017) the 
direct Russian armed involvement in the Middle East has left 35,000 people dead (in the 
civil war that has killed half a million; “Casualties”, 2017). The Kremlin’s military presence 
in Syria is officially justified by Moscow’s heart-felt foreign relations obligation to fight ‘in-
12 In 2017 Kazakhstan decided to replace Cyrillic with Latin letters for writing and publishing in Kazakh by 2025. 
It appears that the country, taking care not to anger the Kremlin too much, wishes to gradually leave the 
sphere of Russia’s cultural influence (Rysaliev, 2017).
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ternational Islamic terrorism.’ The Putin administration is seen as an old and trusted hand 
in this struggle, due to the success of the thorough suppression of the Chechen indepen-
dence movement, officially labelled as ‘terrorist,’ in the course of two Chechen Wars of 
Independence. In turn, these wars radicalized tens of thousands of Chechens, who now 
join Islamic militants across the world, lending a degree of legitimacy to Moscow’s claim 
about the necessity of chasing Chechen terrorists abroad. The Syrian operation also legiti-
mizes the brand of Russia’s ‘managed democracy’ worldwide. Russia is poised to join an 
international of ‘electoral dictatorships’ (also known as ‘illiberal democracies’), as eviden-
ced by the recent entente cordiale developing between Russia and Turkey (Applebaum, 
2016; Gobry, 2016; Matthews, 2016). In addition, for the home consumption, the Russian 
push into the Middle East follows the logic of the half-a-millennium-old policy of the ‘gat-
hering the lands of the Golden Horde.’
On the other hand, the Russian foray into Syria brought the Kremlin’s military forces 
into the vicinity of the Israeli frontiers. No official comments on this fact can be found, but 
this development could be plausibly interpreted from the perspective of the doctrine of the 
Russian world. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, about 1.2 million Jews left for Israel 
from the post-Soviet states. As a community, these Soviet Jews preserved the use of the 
Russian language in Israel and nowadays account for almost a quarter of the country’s 
Jewish population of 6.5 million. On this strength alone, Israel is ‘three times more’ part 
of the Russian world than Moldova with its puny 0.5 million Russian-speakers, or even ’15 
times more’ than Turkmenistan with its officially denied Russophone minority numbering 
100,000 people. Bearing in mind the presence of this sizeable Russian-speaking minority 
in Israel, Moscow’s military adventure in Syria ceases to appear to be an imperial folly 
decided in a proverbial fit of absentmindedness. On the contrary, this intervention logically 
follows the hardening ethnolinguistic tenets of the Russian world ideology.
Furthermore, it allows the Russian military presence to be established tantalizing-
ly close to the Holy City of Jerusalem (cf Melman, 2017; Stesin, 2017). Apart from the 
fond memories of the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire, alongside Russian langua-
ge and culture, the legitimacy of power in post-Soviet Russia is steeped in the Putin 
administration’s close alliance with the Orthodox Church, represented by the Patriarch 
of Russia and All Rus’. Russia is the world’s largest Orthodox state, both in a cultural 
and political sense. The Moscow Patriarchate, as its head’s official title announces, cor-
responds more closely to Mr Putin’s ideal of the Russian world than today’s Russia and 
the Moscow-led EAEU. This Patriarchate’s ecclesiastical territory encompasses all the 
post-Soviet states, alongside Mongolia, China, and Japan. Hence, a growing closeness 
of the Russian world to Jerusalem also boosts the overall legitimacy and prestige of the 
Moscow Patriarchate (Buciora, 2017; “List”, 2017).
The ideological and territorial intertwining of the Kremlin’s Russian world with the Mo-
scow Patriarchate explains the visceral opposition of both to the post-Soviet revival of the 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which is independent of the Moscow Patriarch’s jurisdiction. 
In a way, the Moscow Patriarchate is more successful in retaining its influence in Ukraine 
than the Kremlin itself. Almost a quarter of Ukraine’s Orthodox faithful pledge ecclesia-
stical allegiance to the Moscow Patriarch vis-à-vis the country’s 41 per cent Orthodox 
Christians (or a quarter of the country’s inhabitants) who side with the Ukrainian Ortho-
dox Church. The latter Church, however, is split between the Kyiv Patriarchate and the 
Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which keeps a third of the Orthodox faithful 
from formally committing to any of these patriarchates or churches.
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As a result, the most important monastery complex of Rus’ or East Slavic Orthodoxy, 
namely the Pechersk Lavra in Kyiv, remains under control of the Moscow Patriarchate. Lo-
gically and most beneficially for Ukraine, this sacred site in the country’s capital should be 
overseen by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Disunity—be it of temporal or ecclesiastical 
character—opens a window of opportunity for the Russian aggressor. In 2013 the Kremlin 
lost control of Ukraine, but the Moscow Patriarch retains his jurisdiction over the ecclesia-
stical heart of Kyiv and 15 per cent of Ukrainians. Meanwhile, with the Russian annexation 
of Crimea, the Kremlin firmly brought within the boundaries of Russia and of the Moscow 
Patriarchate the place where in 988 the Rus’ Khagan had been baptized in Chersonesus 
(today, in Sevastopol). This constitutes not only a territorial gain, but also an ideological 
coup for the caesaropapist union between Mr Putin and the Moscow Patriarch.
The politics of historical memory employed for legitimizing present-day political proje-
cts is a slippery slope. Two years before the annexation of Crimea, Mr Putin upped the 
ante by decreeing that as of 2012, the beginning of Russian statehood would be celebra-
ted in the north Russian city of (Veliky) Novgorod. In this year the 1150th anniversary of 
Russia was duly celebrated there in memory of the establishment of this city in 862 by 
the Norseman Rurik. He founded the eponymous Rurik Dynasty, which built and ruled 
over the medieval polity of Rus’. Until the Kremlin’s 2012 intervention, Russian historio-
graphy identified the beginning of Rus’ as a proper polity with Rurik’s successor, Oleg, 
who extended the realm southward. In 882, Oleg captured Kyiv and made this city into 
the capital of Rus’. Before 2012 Russian history textbooks invariably saw this year as the 
actual beginning of Russian statehood. That is why in the 19th century Russian historians 
even coined the anachronistic name “Kievan Rus’’’ for referring to this huge medieval 
polity. However, after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Kyiv found itself outside Russia. 
Admitting that the statehood of all modern states, which share the common heritage of 
Rus’ commenced in Kyiv is unacceptable to today’s Kremlin. Mr Putin’s Russia must be 
number one in all spheres vis-à-vis the other post-Soviet Slavophone countries, including 
the oldest historical origins of the state.
THE HybRIdITy OF HARd CURRENCy
The undeclared casus belli in the case of the recent Russian ‘hybrid non-attacks’ on Geor-
gia and Ukraine was the two countries’ successful efforts to sign and ratify association 
agreements with the European Union (EU). The Kremlin leaned heavily on both Tbilisi and 
Kyiv to declare their agreements null and void. Moscow also seeks the very same end 
by destabilizing (‘hybridizing’) the political situation in Moldova, as yet without resorting 
to the use of naked military force. The Putin administration wants the three post-Soviet 
countries to join the EAEU. If Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine are not stopped in their 
tracks and successfully join the EU (let alone NATO), this development would rattle the 
legitimacy of Russia’s EAEU and even shatter the dream of a unified Russian world. In 
June 2017 it came as a shock both to the Kremlin and the Russian public opinion that 
the EU waived the visa requirement for Ukrainians (“Ukrainians celebrate”, 2017).13 Now 
Ukrainian citizens can roam freely from Lisbon to Vilnius, and from Stockholm to Rome. 
13 A quarter earlier, in March 2017, also Georgian citizens were allowed to travel to the European Union with-
out visas (cf “Georgian citizens”, 2017).
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The same privilege is still withheld from the culturally and historically western-oriented 
Russians, due to Moscow’s anti-western policies and actions during the last decade.14
It is unbelievable to many a Russian that at present a ‘provincial’ Ukrainian may go on a 
trip to Paris without the indignity of having to secure a visa. This is a direct blow to the le-
gitimacy of Putin’s foreign policy. Repercussions followed swiftly, first of all, the massive 
Russian cyberattack on Ukraine on the eve of the country’s Constitution Day of 28 June 
2017. Chillingly, this attack was heralded by the successful assassination of Colonel Mak-
sym Shapoval, Head of the Special Forces of Ukraine’s Military Intelligence. It is another 
from the series of politically motivated assassinations (most probably planned and perpe-
trated by Russia’s secret service) in Kyiv after the ousting of the pro-Russian Yanukovych 
administration (McKew, 2017; Peleschuk, 2017). The Kremlin conveys the message that it 
can do as it wishes in the Ukrainian capital or actually anywhere on the Ukrainian territory. 
This real threat may cow numerous highly qualified specialists with skills of utmost impor-
tance for the defense of Ukraine to keep a low profile or even to emigrate.
What counts more to Mr Putin than the pro-EU wishes of the populations concerned in 
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine is a geopolitical plan that the Kremlin adopted. This holds 
true at least as long as the ‘hybrid conflicts’ can be fought on the cheap, or at best at the 
expense of the countries under Russian attack. As the Panama Papers indicate, the legi-
timacy of Mr Putin’s power at the very pinnacle of his inner circle is staked on the secre-
tive extralegal redistribution of huge financial flows among personal confidantes and top 
civil servants (L. Harding, 2016; Wile, 2017). The monies are duly provided by oligarchs. 
The Kremlin bought their loyalty with the most lucrative companies and branches of the 
Russian economy, which were passed to these oligarchs after 1991. The unaccounted-
for income thus generated is employed for buttressing the power structure as it obtains 
now in Russia, and for the ad hoc plugging of holes, which may appear in the country’s 
overstretched budget (Dawisha, 2014; Gray, 2017). Any prolonged military expense could 
unbalance and even bring down this shaky structure (Holslag, 2015; Kelly, 2014).
Russia with its GDP of $1.3 bn is a middling power that politically punches way above 
its weight. The Russian Federation cannot compare with the Soviet Union that economi-
cally and militarily could and did challenge the United States. The Russian GDP is equal to 
that of Australia, which has a population one-seventh of Russia’s 144 million inhabitants. 
It is also just twice the size of Switzerland’s GDP, a country with a populace one-six-
teenth that of Russia. Tellingly, Israel’s GDP is only four times smaller than the Russian 
counterpart, though in the per capita terms it is four times bigger. If the Russian GDP is 
divided by the country’s territory, it shows that Moscow has a mere $75,000 to spend 
per square kilometer, compared with Israel’s $11,254,000, which is 150 times more. In 
addition, Russia’s economy is over-reliant on the extraction of oil, gas, and anthracite that 
accounts for two-thirds of the country’s exports. Any change in the price of oil may re-
set the entire Russian economy from one day to another. The situation is not conducive 
to socio-economic stability and, by extension, political stability. For the time being, the 
Russian system of ‘managed democracy’ with inbuilt elements of legal and extralegal ar-
bitrariness appears to lend a modicum of necessary stability to the country and the Putin 
administration. Nationalism and the renewed imperial jingoism stoked up by successful 
war operations abroad coax the Russian population at large to acquiesce to the current 
14 A fear is that Moscow may retaliate and impose visas on Ukrainian citizens who now can also travel freely 
across the CIS countries. However, in light of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war in eastern Ukraine, perhaps, 
this sacrifice is well worth paying. Maybe Kyiv should even take the upper hand in this field and introduce 
visa requirement for Russian and other CIS countries’ citizens to enter Ukraine.
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political situation, including the worsening standard of living caused by the 2014 nosedive 
in the oil price. Patriotism requires some sacrifices.
WAR  IS GRATIS
Each of the Kremlin’s three successive military conflicts with Moldova, Georgia, and 
Ukraine that paved the way for the now popular buzz word of ‘hybrid war’ was either or 
still is fought outside Russia. None of the three countries under Russian attack have the 
capacity to bring warfare to the Russian territory. The now foregone hope was, after the 
end of communism, that the Kremlin would relent and Russia would change into a ‘nor-
mal democratic’ country with no imperial ambitions. On the other hand, neither Tbilisi nor 
Kyiv has considered emulating Chechen-style counterattacks that brought the realities of 
the brutal Russo-Chechen conflict to Russia’s cities and towns with ethnically Russian 
(Slavophone and Orthodox) populations. Chiinău, Kyiv, and Tbilisi have moral qualms that 
typically are not shared by the Russian government when it decides to launch an attack.
That is why the wars in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine have been rather inexpensive 
for Russia, unlike the civil war in Chechnya. In the last case, the amount of materiel and 
the number of soldiers deployed for defeating the Chechens almost brought about a near- 
collapse of the Russian economy. The economy was at its most vulnerable during the un-
steady transition from central planning and full state ownership to Mr Putin’s kleptocratic 
capitalism run by oligarchs. Even nowadays the cost of reconstructing Chechnya and ban-
krolling Ramzan Kadyrov’s even more kleptocratic and arbitrary personal rule constitute 
a serious drain on Russia’s budget (“Chechen leader’s MMA empire”, 2017). This clear 
financial and economic constraint prevents Russia from engaging in a traditional kind of 
warfare that involves deployments of hundreds of thousands of soldiers into action and 
subsequently keeping them in place for the long-term occupation of annexed territories. 
For the time being, the Kremlin must do with scarce ‘volunteers’ (including sentenced cri-
minals and gang members) pushed into ‘patriotic duty’ by propaganda, or more frequently 
by inadequate pay and lack of gainful employment in Russia (Kostyuchenko, 2015; “Little 
green men”, 2017; “Russian soldiers”, 2015).
With regard to the war in Moldova, the main expense for the Kremlin has been that of 
the Soviet-turned-Russian army stationed in breakaway Transnistria. Moscow, in line with 
the doctrine of near abroad, has never had any intention of withdrawing this army. The 
budgetary item for its maintenance was kept seamlessly between Soviet and Russian 
budgets. The troops have been a significant instrument for extending and maintaining 
Russian military presence in this far-flung corner of Russia’s near abroad. What is more, 
without any additional cost, this Russian army in Transnistria endangered Ukraine’s strug-
gle against the Russian invasion in the east of the country. If the Ukrainian military for-
ces turn out to be too successful on the eastern front, the Russian troops stationed in 
Transnistria may launch a ‘liberating attack’ on Odesa (cf Lake & Rogin, 2014), where the 
population express substantially more sympathy for Russian language and culture than 
in western and central Ukraine. When the majority of Ukrainian soldiers are engaged in 
the east, the Russian army would have a good chance to push from Transnistria as far 
as Crimea, cutting Ukraine off the Black Sea littoral. A possible Ukrainian reaction in the 
form of a shift of some Ukrainian forces from the east to the west, could in turn enable 
the Russian occupying forces in eastern Ukraine to commence a westward offensive for 
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capturing the intervening Sea of Azov littoral between the occupiers’ current positions in 
Novozaovs’k and Crimea. In such a scenario Kyiv would lose as much as 25 per cent of 
the state’s territory. Overnight Ukraine would become a landlocked country (like Belarus), 
with the two-thirds of its frontiers facing restive Russia.
But when the Kremlin waged war against Georgia in 2008, Moscow actually had to 
send Russian troops abroad for the first time ever in the European post-Soviet world. As 
with the case of Moldova, the intention was to establish a permanent military presence in 
the near abroad. To this end, in 2008 Russian bases were founded in Abkhazia or South 
Ossetia; a move that entailed substantial financial outlays. The step was viable, because 
the oil price stood at its apogee of $130 per barrel. The two territories had been seized 
from Georgia and made into de facto polities. In a unilateral manner Russia recognized 
the independence of these two breakaway regions that ethnically are non-Georgian and 
non-Russian. Then the Kremlin had to face the economic reality of its military adventu-
rism, which among other factors, contributed to the tumbling down of the price of oil to 
a mere $50 by late 2008.
Moscow did not follow this route of formal state recognition in Transnistria, which is 
overwhelmingly Russian (Russophone). The option of either recognizing Transnistria as 
an independent country or incorporating this territory into Russia remains open, the exc-
lave of Kaliningrad being a possible model. As such this equivocation affords the Kremlin 
a useful leverage on Moldova. In reality, all the three aforementioned separatist territories 
are de  facto states that double as second-class Russian regions. Their economies can 
(barely) function, only thanks to the steady flow of cash, aid, and (usually heavily subsi-
dized) business from Russia itself. These territories’ inhabitants need Russian passports 
to travel abroad, the three de facto states’ documents valid only internally, and of no of-
ficial value even in Russia. By the way, the same is true of Russian internal IDs issued in 
Crimea. On their basis, one cannot apply for a loan in a Russian bank. Russia’s financial 
institutions take care not to cross the red line in order not to be cut off the international 
system of finances. Without the possibility of moving capital swiftly across the globe, no 
commercial bank in Russia can count on generating reasonable profit.
In comparison to the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine, the conflict is considerably 
cheaper for the Kremlin, though it involves substantially more territory and population. It 
cannot be otherwise, this war must be fought on the cheap, because the oil price hit a 
new low of $29 per barrel in early 2016. The standard of living that grew quite rapidly in 
Russia during the preceding decade came tumbling down as well. In its stead, wartime 
jingoism and the ‘victory’ of annexing Crimea kept Mr Putin’s popularity ratings up. This 
is the distinctive feature of hybrid war in its pure form: its cheapness for the aggressor 
and the staggering expense in financial, economic, or social terms for the country under 
attack. The media usually overlook this crucial feature and prefer to define hybrid war 
by focusing on colorful propaganda and untruths designed to conceal the actual nature 
of such a conflict from outside and internal observers alike. Due to information overload 
packaged in attractive images (often courtesy of Photoshop), hybrid war appears to onlo-
okers as though another virtual reality computer game. This kind of propaganda—spread 
across the world by Moscow’s multilingual Sputnik and Russia Today news outlets, and 
buttressed by farms of social media trolls in the state’s pay (Chen, 2015; Pollock, 2017)—
makes the global public opinion forgetful to the hard facts of 15,000 casualties and coun-
ting in Ukraine, alongside 1.6 million refugees from the warzones under Russian attack in 
this country.
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The sole tangible financial outlay that the Kremlin made during the current Russo-
Ukrainian war is that on the ongoing construction of the bridge that would span annexed 
Crimea with Russia over the Kerch Strait. The bridge is scheduled to open in 2019. In 
addition, the peninsula’s population was partly absorbed into the Russian system of social 
provisions. However, the flow of water supplied to Crimea from Ukraine was not seriously 
reduced until late 2015, while electricity still goes to the peninsula unobstructed. All this 
is quite inexplicably in the time of war. As a result, Ukraine continues subsidizing Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea, instead of forcing Russia to shoulder the entire burden of providing 
the region’s over 2 million inhabitants with indispensable water and electricity. When the 
Kerch bridge has been opened, the Kremlin will not fail to announce another victory, the 
victory of achieving full energy and water independence from Ukraine. Meanwhile, Kyiv 
buys most of its oil and gas from Russia, affording the Kremlin a simple instrument of gar-
roting the Ukrainian economy and population when the Ukrainian troops are too successful 
at fending off Russian attackers (cf “Battle of Ilovaisk”, 2017; Peterson, 2017). In the co-
urse of the current war, the Kremlin already cut off gas supplies to Ukraine twice, in June 
2014 and November 2015 (cf “Battle of Ilovaisk”, 2017; Peterson, 2017).
A similar situation of Ukraine subsidizing Moscow’s military aggression can be observed 
in Luhansk and Donetsk provinces under Russian occupation. Although Kyiv periodically 
stops the supply of electricity to the two breakaway ‘republics,’ both remain connected to 
the country’s power grid. In the time of such brief stoppages Russia flexes its propaganda 
muscle and sends electricity to Luhansk and Donetsk. It is an expense not worth mentio-
ning, because for most of the time it is Ukraine that continues providing power in exchange 
for anthracite from the Donetsk and Luhansk mines. In addition, through a variety of ad hoc 
arrangements Kyiv keeps paying pensions to the separatist republics’ rapidly aging popula-
tion (most youth with marketable qualifications left either for Ukraine or Russia). However, 
at times pensioners have to make a perilous journey across the frontline to unoccupied 
Ukraine in order to withdraw their pensions from a working ATM machine.
The Ukrainian government may claim that it cannot take a more decisive stance on 
these issues because Ukrainian society is divided in this respect. As many as 70 per cent 
of Ukrainians believe that peace must be reestablished in eastern Ukraine only on the 
basis of a mutually acceptable compromise. Although more than half of the Ukrainians 
agree that eastern Ukraine finds itself under Russian occupation, as few as 18 per cent 
of them would agree to the liberation of these territories with the use of military force. 
Almost two-thirds of Ukrainians think that inviting an international peacekeeping force 
would be a step in the right direction, while a third trusts that international pressure on 
Russia alone would do the job. At the same time, 60 per cent of Ukrainians want the 
population in the occupied areas to have access to Ukraine’s educational and welfare sy-
stems (Hromads’ka dumka, 2017). The confused picture shows that without a principled 
leadership and without a clear line of action, the conflict in the east is poised to drag on 
for years or even decades to come. This is Moscow’s hope that Ukraine may be kept 
down with Ukrainian hands and at the country’s own expense.
bETWEEN PATRIOTISm ANd OLIGARCHS
Year in and year out, thousands of volunteers and draftees join the Ukrainian military to 
fight against the Russian aggression. Across Ukraine’s cities, towns, and villages citizens 
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collect donations for the cash-starved Ukrainian army. Recruitment and donation points, 
alongside churches and many a town square display photographs of Ukrainian soldiers 
killed and missing in action. The chilling everyday reality of the war is also depicted by pho-
tographs of generalized destruction wreaked by the conflict. Day after day, each Ukrainian 
news bulletin and newspaper invariably opens with information on the front, casualties, 
the wounded and displaced (cf Knyha pam’iati, 2017; “Polehli biı˘tsi ATO”, 2017).
The continuing tragedy of this war is deepened by the persistent denial of a proper 
name to the conflict. The Kremlin claims Russia is not involved, while Kyiv sanitizes the 
reality on the ground by dubbing this war ‘ATO,’ or the Anti-Terrorist Operation (“Teryto-
riia”, 2017). A non-war ATO, indeed. But to those fighting and stranded in the warzone, 
shelling and shooting, death and destruction are nothing else but war. They know no 
other word for describing what is happening in front of their eyes, in their backyards and 
apartments scarred by mortar fire. It is war.
Russia shirks from recognizing this war for the fear of becoming an international-
ly acknowledged aggressor, a pariah of international relations. The EU has no intention 
to see the conflict acknowledged as a war, preferring the term ‘crisis’ (“EU sanctions”, 
2017; “The EU’s response”, 2017), because it is easier to import Russian oil and gas than 
to become energetically independent. This attitude yields the oft-repeated slogan that 
‘we have to talk to Russia,’ that the Kremlin must not be alienated for whatever interna-
tional wrongdoings it may be guilty of. Perhaps, this explains why the unpalatable reality 
of the Russo-Ukrainian war is not (or only rarely) reported in the EU countries’ mass me-
dia, including Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania that directly border on Ukraine—as 
though the wave of well over one million Ukrainians who arrived to the countries during 
the last years despite the onerous visa restrictions had nothing to do with the Russo-
Ukrainian war. Western media tire of reporting warfare rather soon, especially when no 
US, British or other western soldiers are involved.
Young male and female Ukrainian soldiers valiantly defending their country on the ea-
stern front are not helped by the west’s odious equivocation on this subject. Their wo-
unds and deaths are for real. How do they feel that at the same time Ukrainian oligarchs 
and oligarchs-turned-politicians continue trading with Russia and the occupied territories 
as if nothing has happened? As if there were no war. These oligarchs and politicians with 
vested economic interests either tone down or out of hand reject any proposals of the 
full economic and financial isolation of the territories occupied by Russia. In September 
2014, after Russia’s seizure of Ukraine and the eruption of fighting in eastern Ukraine, 
Kyiv decided to build a border wall along Ukraine’s almost 2000-kilometer-long land fron-
tier with Russia (“Ukraine-Russia”, 2017). Due to the occupation of Luhansk and Donetsk 
provinces Russia effectively controls a quarter of this boundary. However, after constru-
cting about 200 kilometers of the wall, the work stopped in 2017. The funds had run out. 
The completion deadline of 2018 will not be kept (“Ukraine runs”, 2017).15 The Ukrainian- 
Russian border remains largely unguarded and unprotected, open to Russian infiltration, 
contraband, or human trafficking. Russian citizens can cross the frontier without the ne-
cessity of applying for a Ukrainian visa (Petrov, 2017a; “Ukraine bans Russians”, 2015; 
“Ukraine’s new border restrictions”, 2017). As though Russia did not attack Ukraine and 
were a friendly country. As if Ukraine has already become part of the Russian world.
15 However, in August 2017 the news is that Kyiv persists in its effort to complete the border wall (“Ukraine 
bans its top social networks”, 2017).
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The Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko’s Roshen confectionary company with the 
annual revenue of $1 billion has factory shops in most Ukrainian cities and towns. Quite 
an unusual feat for any confectionary company, let alone in a country in the state of war. 
Even more damningly, despite the early 2017 promise to close down the company’s 
Russian factory in Lipetsk, Roshen continues to retain its economic and commercial pre-
sence in enemy territory. Mr Poroshenko claims that it is the Putin administration who 
does not permit him to stop production at this plant. But in reality there is nothing pre-
venting him from abandoning the plant without lowering himself to any squabble with 
Moscow on legal niceties (“Zakrytie”, 2017). Mr Poroshenko is unable to decide what 
is more important for him—the Presidency of Ukraine or owning and managing his con-
fectionary empire. He has not decided yet, though his five-year term in office comes 
to an end in 2019. In the time of war trading with and maintaining personal economic 
presence in Russia appears dangerously close to an act of treason. Widening a network 
of his own confectionary shops in Ukraine, which is fighting a war against authorita-
rian and neo-imperialist Russia is an utmost folly. The territorial integrity of Ukraine is 
at stake. And, even more importantly, whether Ukraine is going to become a modern, 
democratic, and prosperous state run in accordance with the rule of law, as demanded 
by the Revolution of Dignity. Then the Ukrainians’ utmost dream could be fulfilled, of 
their country’s membership in the European Union and NATO. Thus far thousands of 
Ukrainians have sacrificed their very lives for this dream. So their children at long last 
could live in a ‘normal country.’ Poroshenko by continuing to use his political clout for 
propping up the Roshen Company opens himself to the accusation of being guilty of a 
blatant conflict of interests.
No statesman worthy of note was ever a businessman. Neither Abraham Lincoln, nor 
Winston Churchill, nor Konrad Adenauer, nor Indira Gandhi. Can we imagine Churchill le-
ading an effective war against the German aggressor, if he had been more concerned 
about his hypothetical network of convenience shops in Britain and Germany? Had he 
had to choose between launching an attack on Berlin, or keeping his shops in Bavaria? 
A laughable and incongruent impossibility. Yet, this is the reality of Ukraine’s economy 
and politics. Politicians bowing to their personal economic interest, with no respect for the 
dignity of their offices or for the wishes of their electorates do not auger well for Ukraine. 
At the country’s helm is a person stands who may still decide that his company is dea-
rer to his heart than Ukraine. In Russia, it is crystal clear that Mr Putin controls and uses 
Russia’s oligarchs, as he sees fit, not the other way around.
Should Mr Poroshenko choose his company over Ukraine and lower himself to the un-
becoming status of an oligarch, he may easily fit in the oligarchic system that the Kremlin 
aspires to export across the Russian world. The system’s center is located in Moscow. 
The Russian leader has an obvious advantage over the current Ukrainian President: Mr 
Putin prefers to be President of Russia, while oligarchs are his underlings. As a result, 
the Russian President cuts a more charismatic figure, evoking loyalty across the whole 
spectrum of the Russian population. On the contrary, hardly any Ukrainian soldier can be 
truly inspired by Mr Poroshenko the oligarch, though officially he is known as President of 
Ukraine. Mr Poroshenko’s ambiguous stance not only mars the gravitas of this office, but 
weakens the Ukrainians’ resolution to fend off the Russian aggression. If their President, 
despite delivering rousing speeches, in reality cares more for his own profits, why should 
an average Ukrainian citizen give up their personal well-being or happiness, let alone life, 
in service of their country?
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In order to be able to lead Ukraine through this difficult time of war to a future of pea-
ce and prosperity, Mr Poroshenko ought to channel any profits gained from his company 
after becoming President in 2014 for the sake of war effort. He must give up his compa-
ny to the state after securing sufficient (but not ostensible) funds for his family. Otherwi-
se, the Ukrainian President’s pronouncements announcing that Ukraine’s future lies in 
the EU and NATO will remain hollow words devoid of meaning. For God’s sake, young 
Ukrainian women and men are dying in the east not for sweets, peanuts or, let alone, the 
Roshen Company.
Has the President noticed? Who’s going to tell him?
Through the mass media and via the internet many Ukrainians have expressed time 
and again their dismay at Mr Poroshenko’s harmful vacillation. Numerous members of 
the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s Parliament) berate him on this account, alongside Brus-
sels and NATO. But Mr Poroshenko keeps his options open, blaming this unprincipled 
stance he took on the Russian military aggression. The pressure does not work. Pe-
sky opponents in the Parliament can be bought or turned around with a political favor. 
Ukraine’s civil society keeps operating in a bubble of its own organizations and publica-
tions without a clear way to translate its considerable energy and desire for change into 
a tangible political action. The west is easily distracted and pays way too little attention 
to the difficult process of democratization in Ukraine or to the Russo-Ukrainian war. The 
unarticulated suspicion is that many western European governments continue in their un-
wise proclivity not to treat Ukraine seriously. This is a dangerous political myopia that 
plays directly into Russia’s hands. Mr Poroshenko’s indecision worsens this tendency.16 
The social capital and support for change, as generated during the Revolution of Dignity, 
is abused and carelessly wasted.
This is high time to wake up.
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